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AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL NORM FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Stephanie Jonassaint Cotton-Betteridge*

I. INTRODUCTION
“The image is a familiar one. There is a long line of people, mostly
women and children waiting under a blue sky. At the far end of the line
aid workers are handing out the daily ration of maize meal, with perhaps
some powdered milk for the children. Looking at the scene you can
almost feel the heat and the despair.”1
This scene, from Swaziland, Africa,2 describes the far too familiar
and recurrent picture of a devastated population waiting for nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs’) humanitarian assistance after a
natural disaster or an armed conflict. Women and children with shattered
faces, often spend the whole day waiting in hopes of getting a little bag
of food with a few bottles of water for the next few days from NGOs
working in the country.
NGOs are groups that play an active role in administering
humanitarian assistance3 in different countries and in deciding matters of
international significance. NGOs play an important part in the
development of international law in areas as diverse as human rights,4
religious rights, 5 health, 6 education, 7 environmental, 8 food, 9 and human
trafficking. 10 NGOs are able to organize and provide much-needed
assistance and support for private individuals and other entities all over
the world. 11 Nevertheless, while the assistance and support these
organizations provide can be invaluable, it has the potential to become

* Juris Doctor candidate 2016, Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School. I owe many
thanks to Professor Eric Jensen for his inestimable guidance while writing this Comment. I am
grateful to Samuel Cotton-Betteridge for his unwavering support, and to Kristy Brookhart for her
thoughtful review of the paper.
1
Gary Perkins, Refugees Magazine, Issue 97 (NGOs and UNHCR) - Bright spot in Africa,
REFUGEES MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1994, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b540c254.html.
2
Id.
3
Non-Governmental
Organizations,
UNITED
NATIONS
RULE
OF
LAW,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=23 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) [hereinafter UNITED
NATIONS RULE OF LAW].
4
Id.
5
Religious Right Research, AMERICANS UNITED, https://www.au.org/resources/religious-right
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014 6:13 PM) [hereinafter AMERICANS UNITED].
6
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
7
Id.
8
GREENPEACE, (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/.
9
FOOD FOR THE POOR, http://www.foodforthepoor.org/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
10
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, (Nov. 26, 2014)
http://www.refugees.org/resources/for-lawyers/human-trafficking-resources/human-traffickingagencies.html.
11
Id.
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counterproductive if the NGOs are not well-governed and if they do not
ensure that the assistance is consistent with a set of best practices.
NGOs are generally the creations of private groups and are relatively
simple to form.12 They are governed by the national laws of the country
of incorporation and do not enjoy a legal personality under international
law. 13 Because NGOs are inherently not part of a government, 14 the
assistance they offer is generally distributed independently of State
actors.15 This creates a situation where NGOs go to countries (Receiving
States) where help is needed and operate as separate entities from the
Receiving Countries’ national institutions.16 Although the organizations
may utilize the inadequate framework or structure provided by the
Receiving Countries, NGOs generally do not include a blueprint for the
countries that would coordinate with their efforts. This is especially true
when the NGOs are responding to emergency situations. The relief
efforts are then disseminated among the different groups working in
those countries without cooperation and often without consistency to
promote or reinforce a long-term, sustainable model of change.17
This lack of cooperation results in Receiving States, at times,
becoming almost completely reliant on NGO services18 and occasionally
no longer providing adequately for the welfare of their own citizens. In
some instances, the NGOs’ work tends to replace the States’ institutions
because of the States’ reliance on them. In other instances, the States’
national institutions and industries are weakened because they cannot
compete with free or donated resources from the humanitarian help.19
12

Id.
Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM J. INT’L
L. 348, 355–56 (2006); See generally Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in
International Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2003); Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences
of Globalization: The Status of Non-governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579 (1999).
14
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
15
Charnovitz, supra note 13. (“In the eyes of the international donor community, NGOs are
both cost-effective in reaching the poor and are considered "the preferred channel for service
provision, in deliberate substitution for the state.”).
16
See J. Wagona Makoba, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOS) and Third World
Development: An Alternative Approach to Development, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31620.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014)
(“In order to maximize the impact of scarce development aid, many donors are channeling an
increasing share of their overseas development aid (ODA) through NGOs. . . . Increasingly, a large
number of NGOs in the Third World are funded by a small number of donors such as the World
Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP). The World Bank not only encourages member governments to
work with NGOs on development projects, but also directly funds the NGO projects. It is reported
that, ‘from 1973 to 1988, NGOs were involved in about 15 [World] Bank projects a year. By 1990
that number had jumped to 89, or 40 percent of all new projects approved.’ And in 1997, approved
World Bank projects in Third World countries involving NGOs were: 84 percent in South Asia, 61
percent in Africa, and 60 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean. USAID is said to funnel 20
percent of its funds through NGOs. The Inter-American Foundation Survey of North and Latin
America ‘revealed that most of the multilateral banks, the United Nations, USAID, and advocacy
organizations in the United States and Europe favored a restructuring of aid away from traditional
government-to-government approaches toward people-to-people programs.’ Furthermore, the public
sentiment in the United States and Europe seems to be ‘in favor of NGO participation in the
development process and against governmental foreign aid.’”) (emphasis added).
17
Aid Dependency: I Need You as Much as You Need Me, GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY AT NYUWAGNER (Oct. 27, 2014), https://globalhealthpolicynyu.wordpress.com/2014/10/27/aid-dependencyi-need-you-as-much-as-you-need-me/.
18
Id.
19
Id.
13
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For NGOs and States to accomplish long-term sustainable change,
the NGOs should incorporate, as part of their best practices, an
obligation to coordinate relief efforts with Receiving States, rather than
working independently of the States. This Comment will demonstrate the
anticipated positive effect of an obligation for NGOs to coordinate with
Receiving States to maximize efficiency when offering their assistance,
and to adopt this obligation as part of their international good governance
principles. This proposed obligation is a social and emerging norm that
would be diffused and emulated among NGOs and would serve as a
more fruitful model that could be replicated consistently in any country
needing similar aid.20 Haiti is a prime example of a country becoming
less self-sufficient due to NGOs not coordinating with the government
and with each other. This example is discussed in detail in Part IV.
Part II will present background information about NGOs, their status,
and role in the international community. Part III will analyze the best
practices of NGOs and will introduce the concept of an emerging norm
that NGOs ought to have the obligation to work with the Receiving
States when providing humanitarian assistance. This is not an argument
that NGOs must work through States or be controlled by States. Rather,
they should be independent of States in order to offer objective support.
This makes them very valuable in the international arena. NGOs should
implement this proposed obligation as part of their best practices, which
in turn would create an effective and consistent model of assistance in
Receiving Countries that any NGO can later emulate. Part IV will
examine a case study of some NGOs’ work in Haiti that illustrates the
need for the organizations to follow the emerging practice in good
governance. Part V will reiterate and detail the emerging norm. Part VI
will conclude.
II. WHAT ARE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS?
A. NGOs Background
This section gives a background on NGOs and explains the roles
they play specifically with regard to international law. NGOs play an
important role in the development and the interpretation of international
law. They also fill an important humanitarian need during times of
emergency situations.
1. Definition
An NGO is generally defined as a group of people or private
communities that come together to support or promote a mutual objective
20
Haiti is mainly used throughout the paper as an example of the deficiency of the international
organizations short-term relief as a long-term substitute because of the concentration of the NGOs in
that country, but the problems highlighted are found in many different Receiving States that are in
need of external international assistance.
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as a non-profit organization.21 The term NGO, although widely used, is
not the standard term used to identify these different groups. NGOs use
terms such as “civil societies” as well as a variety of acronyms to classify
the type of work they set out to accomplish. The following are some of
the most common acronyms widely used:
BINGO (business-friendly international NGO or big
international NGO); the Red Cross is one example of a
BINGO;
ENGO (environmental NGO); the World Wildlife Fund
is one example of an ENGO;
GONGO (government-operated NGO), by definition not
an NGO, but an organization created by a government to
resemble an NGO to further some agenda;
INGO (international NGO); Oxfam is one example of an
INGO;
QUANGO (quasi-autonomous NGO), an NGO which
may have some governmental members; the ISO is one
example of a QUANGO;
RINGO (religious international NGO); the Catholic
Relief Services is one example of a RINGO.22
As expressed earlier, these groups are not typically part of States or
governments.23 They are relatively simple to form, and are organized on
a local, national, or international level.24 Because NGOs are not created
under international law, the national laws of the country in which it was
formed govern them. 25 They perform many activities that can be
transnational in scope (performed in many different countries)26 in areas
such as human rights, 27 religious rights, 28 health, 29 education, 30
environmental,31 food,32 women’s rights,33 and humanitarian assistance.34

21

UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
Margaret
Rouse,
NGO
(non-governmental
organization),
WHAT
I S,
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/NGO-non-governmental-organization (last updated June
2010).
23
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
24
Id.
25
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 352.
26
Id.
27
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
28
AMERICANS UNITED, supra note 5.
29
Id.
30
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
31
GREENPEACE, supra note 8.
32
FOOD FOR THE POOR, supra note 9.
33
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3 (“International Women's Rights Action Watch
(IWRAW) promotes recognition of women’s human rights under the United Nation’s Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the CEDAW Convention). Since its
inception, IWRAW’s program has expanded to encompass advocacy for women’s human rights
under all the international human rights treaties. IWRAW Asia Pacific is an independent human
rights organization with a regional focus, working towards the implementation of the human rights
of women. It seeks to promote an effective flow of information on the CEDAW Convention between
the local and the global levels, thereby enabling women to monitor and facilitate the implementation
of the Convention domestically and utilize it to advance their interests. . . . Women Living Under
Muslim Laws is an international solidarity network, linking individual women and organizations in
22
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2. Role
According to Steve Charnovitz, an expert on NGO organization,
NGOs are focused, among other things, on the development,
interpretation, and enforcement of international law. 35 They are also
sources of humanitarian assistance during times of conflict or natural
disasters.36
NGOs play an important role in the development of international
law. 37 For example, Professor A. Dan Tarlock 38 argued that with
international environmental law, “NGOs helped to spur action to
accelerate the phase-out of CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons: [a] gas that
threatens the ozone layer) and play an increasingly powerful role in
setting the global environmental agenda.” 39 The United Nations
Environment Programme describes the non-governmental role as
follows: “Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the
shaping and implementation of participatory democracy.” 40 The
Programme also mentioned that the NGO’s “credibility lies in the
responsible and constructive role they play in society.” 41 The Programme
continues, saying that “formal and informal organizations, as well as
grass-roots movements, should be recognized as partners in the
implementation of Agenda 21, which is a comprehensive plan of action
adopted by more than 178 Governments at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janerio, Brazil, in 1992.” 42 Still according to the same source “the nature
of the independent role played by non-governmental organizations within
a society calls for real participation; therefore, independence is a major
attribute of non-governmental organizations and is the precondition of
real participation.” 43
NGOs can be a tremendous resource in the interpretation of
international law.44 They increasingly participate as observers in treaty
more than 70 countries. It provides information, support and a collective space for women whose
lives are shaped, conditioned or governed by laws and customs said to derive from Islam.”).
34
Id.
35
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 352.
36
International Organizations & NGOs, UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE DEPOT,
http://www.unhrd.org/?page_id=853 (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (“Some UN partners in providing
humanitarian assistance in different countries and different sectors.”).
37
Id.
38
A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of
International Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 63 (1992) (Distinguished Professor of
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Strengthening the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations: Partners for Sustainable
NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME
Development,
UNITED
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=75&l=en
(last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
44
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 352–53; Duncan Hollis, Symposium: Globalization & The
Erosion Of Sovereignty In Honor Of Professor Lichtenstein: Private Actors In Public International
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negotiations and actively submit amici curiae to numerous international
courts such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),45 the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), 46 and the Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights47 with respect to the interpretation or clarification, inter alia, of
treaties in dispute settlements.
Some NGOs play an active role in the development and the
enforcement of international law.48 The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL), for example, is an NGO that collaborated with other
human rights organizations to play an integral part in the “changes,
implementation, and enforcement of government policies and practices
on addressing the humanitarian suffering caused by landmines.”49
Additionally, NGOs are often sources of humanitarian assistance
during times of conflict or natural disasters. They increasingly play a
significant role in delivering humanitarian aid and development
assistance. “Most non-governmental organizations in the rule of law field
are engaged in some form of direct assistance or services.” 50 Many
provide assistance directly in numerous local, regional, and international
communities and as partners to United Nations (UN) agencies.51
Some organizations function as an NGO, yet do not consider
themselves to be one. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) is one example. The ICRC is a UN partner whose organization is
mandated by States that are parties to the Geneva Convention. 52

Law: Amicus Curiae And The Case For The Retention Of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 235 (2002).
45
WTO, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 9, Participation in dispute
settlement proceedings: 9.3 Amicus Curiae submissions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2014).
46
ICJ, Verbatim Record of public sitting of 2009/32 - 10/12/2009 - Accordance with
international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (Request for
COURT
OF
JUSTICE,
Advisory
Opinion),
INTERNATIONAL
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/141/15759.pdf#view=FitH&pagemode=none&search=%22amicus
%20curiae%20ngo%22 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014 at 9:06 PM).
47
Inter-American Court Of Human Rights- Amici Curiae Brief, NEW YORK CITY BAR,
http://www2.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/pdf/El%20Escrito%20de%20amicus%20curiae%20en%
20ingles.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014 8:35 PM).
48
Michael Crowley & Andreas Persbo, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Monitoring and Verification of International Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (2006), THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
SECURITY
NETWORK,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=47365
(last visited Oct. 19, 2014 at 10:42 PM).
49
Who We Are, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, http://www.icbl.org/engb/about-us/who-we-are/the-icbl.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2014 10:54 PM) (The International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) raises awareness and advocates at the national, regional, and
international levels. Through its global membership, the ICBL brings the reality of mine-affected
communities into the diplomatic arena. ICBL campaigners around the world work in a spirit of
cooperation with their governments and other partners to ensure countries join the Mine Ban Treaty
and live up to the letter and spirit of the treaty.).
50
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
51
Id.
52
The ICRC Its Mission and Work, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, (2009)
available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0963.pdf (“The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and
other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.” The organization’s work involves
developing and promoting international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles.).
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Although the ICRC does not consider itself to be an NGO,53 it basically
fulfills the same functions as the typical NGOs with respect to delivering
humanitarian aid.54 To a certain extent, NGOs are “increasingly regarded
as an alternative to direct State action in the implementation of specific
projects. At times, some NGOs implement State directives, but on other
occasions these same groups carry out projects without major State
intervention.” 55 Food for the Poor is another example of an NGO
involved in delivering direct humanitarian assistance to international
communities.56
NGOs play an important role in “national rule of law reform
processes and at the global and international level.” 57 They can
encourage individual States to adopt international legal obligations that
are established by international standards or practices.58
As recognized, NGOs represent very diverse groups that are
involved in many areas of international interests and concerns that help
with the development, interpretation, and enforcement of international
law. They are also sources of humanitarian assistance during times of
conflict or natural disasters.
B. NGOs’ Status and Binding Laws
The UN Charter, Article 71 States that NGOs are granted
consultative status within their respective competence with the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the six principal organs of the
United Nations System established by the UN Charter in 1945.59 In the
U.S.,60 for example, these organizations are generally incorporated as
not-for-profit organizations under the Code of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service. With this status, they qualify as exempt from state and federal
taxation. The tax-exempt status also allows donors to take a tax
deduction for their donations. Under U.S. laws different statuses are
available for different types of NGOs. For instance, NGOs that are
organized under U.S. law that do not play a partisan political role, such
as attempting to influence legislation (domestically or internationally),
53
The Movement, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, (Aug 24, 2013),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/movement/overview-the-movement.htm.
54
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 352.
55
Ingrid Rossi, Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law,
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN FACULTY OF LAW ACADEMIC YEAR 2009-2010,
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/249936/1/Rossi.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014 at
11:50 PM).
56
See generally FOOD FOR THE POOR, supra note 9.
57
UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, supra note 3.
58
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 361–63.
59
About ECOSOC and its Subsidiary Bodies, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, available at http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=123.
60
Fact Sheet: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States, U.S. Department
of State, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV (Jan 1, 2012), http://www.humanrights.gov/fact-sheet-nongovernmental-organizations-ngos-in-the-united-States.html (According to the United States
Department of States 2012 fact-sheet, approximately 1.5 million NGOs are active in the United
States.).
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can apply to receive exemption from federal income taxation on all
income related to these purposes. U.S. law generally regulates
organizations by requiring regular public disclosure—through filing
information returns with the government—of an organization’s funding,
activities, and leadership.61 This ensures that the NGO is subject to U.S.
law.
Furthermore, NGOs have legal personality only in national law,
which allows individuals or organizations to ascertain certain legal
rights, protections, and responsibilities, domestically but not
internationally.62 Because of the nature of their diverse endeavors, NGOs
sometimes operate outside of the country of incorporation, where other
governments or States might not recognize their status,63 nevertheless,
their work will still affect those other States.
As a result of the transnational nature of NGOs and their flexibility
in working within different States in addressing public concerns, the
ECOSOC can ask for NGOs’ assistance in developing procedures or
deciding matters of international importance. This consultative status
allows NGOs to participate either as observers or experts in UN meetings
and conferences. 64 The purpose of consultative status is to enable
ECOSOC organizations “to secure expert information or advice from
organizations having special competence in the subjects for which
consultative arrangements are made, and, on the other hand, to enable
international, regional, sub regional and national organizations that
represent important element of public opinion to express their views.”65
Part of the requirements to be eligible for consultative status is defined
by the ECOSOC: “Consultative relationships may be established with
international, regional, sub regional and national non-governmental, nonprofit public or voluntary organizations. . . . [NGOs] affiliated to an
international organization already in status may be admitted provided
that they demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance
to the aims and purposes of the United Nations.” 66
The ECOSOC has a set of requirements in place for the NGOs if
they want to be accorded consultative status with the UN. “To be
eligible, an NGO must have been in existence (officially registered with
the appropriate government authorities as an NGO) for at least two years,
must have an established headquarters, a democratic constitution,
authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate

61

Id.
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 355–56.
63
Id. at 356 (“Yet because NGOs so often operate in more than one country, they face potential
problems of being subject to conflicting laws and of inability to carry their legal status from one
country to another.”) (quoting Pasquale Fiore who wrote that societies which are “the result of
freedom of association for a common interest” are granted rights by the sovereignty of a state, and
thus that such societies “may not as of right exercise their functions in foreign countries.” PASQUALE
FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED AND ITS LEGAL SANCTION 34–35 n.1 (Edwin M. Borchard
trans., 1918)).
64
See Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental
organizations, U.N. Charter Art. 71; ECOSOC Res. 1996/31 (July 23, 1996), UNITED NATION,
http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm.
65
Id.
66
Id.
62
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mechanisms of accountability and democratic processes.” 67 If an
organization is established by governments or intergovernmental
agreements, it is not considered an NGO. “The basic resources of the
organization must be derived in the main part from contributions of the
national affiliates or other components or from individual members.”68
ECOSOC remains the only main UN body with a formal framework
for NGO participation,69 but the practice of consultative role for NGOs
has become gradually established throughout the entire UN system.70
From 1948 to 2007, the number of NGOs in consultative status with the
ECOSOC has increased from 40 to more than 3,000.71
The national laws under which the NGOs are incorporated dictate the
regulations that they have to follow in order to qualify for state laws
status. NGOs also operate outside of the country of incorporation and can
be granted consultative status as experts or observers, within their areas
of work, with the ECOSOC, an organ of the UN. Because of the lack of
international status accorded to NGOs, the work they accomplish on the
international field can differ widely from one organization to another. As
a result, established norms or best practices can provide a set of
consistent practices NGOs can look to while operating in different
countries around the world.
III. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS’ OBLIGATION AS
PART OF BEST PRACTICES
This Part examines the proposed emerging norm that nongovernmental organizations ought to have a responsibility to work with
and coordinate with the Receiving States. NGOs should implement this
emerging norm into a set of best practices. This would create an effective
and consistent model of humanitarian assistance that can be observed and
followed in any Receiving Country. Such proposed coordination would
also provide a system of checks and balances between the Receiving
States and the NGOs. In the area of fund management for instance, it
would promote accountability and transparency. The purpose of this
article is to demonstrate that placing a responsibility, or social obligation,
on NGOs to work with Receiving States would yield better results
because it would enable both entities to pool their resources. NGOs
working separately often undermine the Receiving States’ efforts,
weaken national institutions, and distort the relationship between States

67

Consultative
Status
with
ECOSOC,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/about.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2014 at 12:08 PM)
[hereinafter Consultative Status].
68
Id.
69
Id.
69
Working with ECOSOC: An NGOs Guide to Consultative Status, UNITED NATIONS available
at http://csonet.org/content/documents/Brochure.pdf.
70
Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 358.
71
Consultative Status, supra note 67.
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and its citizens. Working separately does not serve the States’ interest in
the long term.
The Oxford Dictionary defines best practices as “commercial or
professional procedures that are accepted or prescribed as being correct
or most effective.”72 The basic assumption about the term is that the
governance, practices, and results are consistent enough such that a "best
practice" can be derived and later implemented by another group. The
ECOSOC’s Civil Society Network branch of the UN lists a number of
best practices for several NGOs registered with the UN.73 This list shows
various best practices that NGOs use around the world in promoting their
work and their general practice of good governance.74
Another example of a successful NGO model occurred in South East
Asia. The study featured in the ECOSOC Civil Society Network,
demonstrates a number of successful best practices from NGOs that
originated in Cambodia and are now used consistently throughout South
East Asia. 75 The project was aimed at providing a set of good models in
successful projects that can be benchmarked and applied in different
contexts or countries with some tailoring and modification. 76 The study
established the importance of combining multiple models and partnering
among different stakeholders as two key factors to successfully creating
a good model for a given region, in this case South East Asia. 77 Located
in Cambodia, the NGO, Cambodia Development Resource Institute
(CDRI) worked on a project that aimed at researching and reinforcing the
democratic governance and public sector reform. 78 Its goal was to
“[d]evelop a global partnership for development,” and CDRI included the
further development of “an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system.” 79 It also included “a
commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction –
both nationally and internationally.” 80 Additionally, CDRI used a model
of partnership with the government.81
A set of best principles to work and coordinate with States, while in
the Receiving States, would enhance the assistance that NGOs are
attempting to offer because it demonstrates respect for the autonomy of
the Receiving States. The set of best practices would not require the
NGOs to work through the state, which would make them a subsidiary of
the state. Rather, it would assure the NGOs’ independence and their
participatory status as unbiased parties that can denounce State inaction
72
Definition
of
best
practice
in
English,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
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or help States in their efforts. At the same time, this emerging norm
would ensure a consistent and successful model that NGOs could
continue to follow and benchmark in different countries with similar
humanitarian needs.
A. Emerging Norm: NGOs Ought to Work with the Receiving States
The main purpose of this Comment is to examine and propose an
emerging norm that would place responsibility on NGOs to work and
coordinate with Receiving States when providing assistance or services.
This proposed norm emerged out of the need to address problems that
were counterproductive to overall humanitarian goals. Problems such as
uncoordinated efforts with the States do not maximize the effectiveness
of the assistance offered—in part because they encourage State
dependency on NGOs. This can incapacitate the local, national
institutions and shift citizens’ confidence from the State to NGOs.
Another issue created by an NGO that refuses to coordinate with a State
is that it fails to help establish the infrastructure that is so vital for the
state’s long-term self-sufficiency.
B. Problems
1. Uncoordinated Efforts of States and NGOs
The uncoordinated efforts of Receiving States and NGOs can make
the assistance run parallel to the actors’ work and challenge the
efficiency of both parties. Usually NGOs are smaller organizations82 that
have “smaller costs of bureaucracy and the potential for greater
efficiencies in the use of donated funds,”83 but that can create a situation
where their work is not coordinated. Because of the generally private
structure and flexibility of such organizations,84 NGOs do not have an
obligation to consult with each other, and many of these organizations
often offer their help in the same area (education, health care, etc.) within
a Receiving State.85 This lack of coordination among NGOs themselves
and with the States can lead to disjointed efforts, which creates the risk
of wasteful overlap.
To illustrate this point, consider the humanitarian effort of several
NGOs in the Philippines after a typhoon devastated a part of the country
82
The List of the Most Powerful Development NGOs, FOREIGN POLICY, (July 1, 2008)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/06/30/the_list_the_worlds_most_powerful_developmen
t_ngos (Smaller when compared to a nation’s organization. Some NGOs have grown to be quite
large in terms of organizational structure and access to funds.).
83
Suzanne McCoskey, NGOs in the Aid Community: Do Funding Source or Economic
Conditioning Matter to Decisions of Country or Activity Involvement? TUFTS (Feb. 23, 2009),
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/381.
84
See Perkins, supra note 1.
85
John Sinden, Ten Innovative NGOs in Education, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ONLINE
(Sept. 12, 2014), http://ironline.american.edu/ten-innovative-ngos-in-education/.
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in 2013. The NGOs went to distribute vaccines in poor, rural areas
because the State was not providing enough for its citizens. 86 Later,
because of a lack of coordinated efforts to keep track of the
immunization, another NGO went to the exact same area to provide the
exact same vaccine.87 Possibly because of language barriers, the people
in the area could not confirm if they had already received the vaccine or
not.
To further contextualize the argument, an example of a lack of
coordinating efforts between NGOs and the Haitian government after the
devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake in January 2010, is represented in
this article entitled “Haiti, One Year Later.” 88 The article makes
reference to the many NGOs that went to Haiti to save lives and provide
badly needed care. 89 But it also criticized the efforts that the article
defined as “uncoordinated and often at cross-purposes with government
policies.” 90 It elaborated by stating “the flood of volunteer doctors
providing free emergency care has forced several Haitian hospitals into
bankruptcy, weakening an already fragile medical ecosystem. Camps run
by charitable organizations or celebrities like Sean Penn have
discouraged some Haitians from leaving the overcrowded capital or
returning to habitable homes.”91
An NGO’s practice to work with the Receiving States would provide
coordination between the parties that would prevent overlap and promote
efficiency. Such coordination would ensure that NGOs’ efforts do not
undermine the state’s efforts in providing for its citizens. When NGOs
register with countries on a humanitarian basis, these countries are then
relying on the extra help. However, without coordination between the
actors, the assistance can run parallel to each other’s efforts, and in some
cases, be counterproductive.
2. States’ National Dependency
Another reason why NGOs should work with Receiving States as an
emerging norm is because of those States’ increasing dependency on
international help.92 In some cases, States can come to rely so much on
NGOs that they almost completely neglect areas of traditional
government support. 93 At some point, these sectors, or sometimes
86
Vijaya Ramachandran & Owen Barder, Let’s Help the Philippines — but Not Like We
Helped Haiti, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/letshelp-the-philippines--but-not-like-we-helped
haiti/2013/11/15/8b8a890c-4ca5-11e3-be6bd3d28122e6d4_story.html (The Red Cross reported that there were too many doctors but not enough
midwives in Indonesia’s Banda Aceh province. Children became ill with the symptoms of measles
after being vaccinated three times by three organizations, because the NGOs did not share records of
which immunizations children had received.).
87
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industries, suffer from a lack of support and long-term foresight.94 Such a
situation, in the long run, creates State dependency by resulting in
weakened national institutions, and a lack of autonomy.95
Rather than helping countries be more self-sufficient and grow their
industries, NGO assistance can, in spite of worthy intentions, do more
harm than good by creating a State that is completely dependent.96 By
allowing countries to rely on donated funds as an apparatus to sustain the
educational sector, for instance, NGOs and other international
organizations create a dependency that is difficult to overcome. A State
with a large portion of its national budget expenditure supported by
international aid has to take into consideration the international donors
desires because these funds usually have conditions attached.97 These
conditions can hinder a state’s right to self-determination.98 As recently
noted in Forbes:
In post-earthquake Haiti one can find multiple rubble
removal programs. Due to the influx of cash donations,
NGOs have more financial resources than the Haitian
government and are able to pay day laborers $7 per day
to remove debris. Before the earthquake the Haitian
government had reviewed the idea of setting a national
minimum wage at $7 but discovered that nation’s
economy would be unable to support it. This rubble
removal program set up to help the Haitian people
undermines the Haitian government, which in turn
undermines Haiti as whole.99
Dependency on NGOs also can have undesirable effects on States’
national institutions. It can de-incentivize a State to provide solutions to
its problems because “others” are taking care of them.100 However, if the
argument for state’s dependency is focused on financial management,
this dependency encourages unsupervised spending which can result in a
usurpation of funds, no fiscal accountability from government, and
94
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inevitable corruption. 101 When a State is dependent on international
funds to conduct the management of its institutions, it cannot budget or
plan appropriately. 102 An additional problem is that the aid is not
consistent every year. The State has to wait to determine its budget for
the year, whereas other States depend on their revenues to budget
accordingly.103 Because the budget is then made so fluid, it is easy for
spending to become unsupervised or have unexplained gaps in
expenditure. These unexplained gaps allow for a lack of fiscal
accountability and for corruption to flourish.104
By continually subsidizing the NGOs instead of the Receiving
States, there is a risk of counter productivity with respect to the States’
efforts and the desire to assist them.105 The United Nations Office of the
Special Envoy for Haiti (OSE) reported that virtually all the early relief
aid right after the 2010 earthquake was channeled through international
humanitarian agencies, with little to none going towards rebuilding the
shattered Haitian government, despite donors’ claims that they were
there to support the government.106 The OSE declared that by the end of
2011, the majority of donors had not yet released roughly two-thirds of
the funds pledged for 2010/2011 for earthquake response and recovery,
and only twelve percent of international aid was channeled through the
government. 107 This process undermines the existing government by
creating more State dependency on international aid provided by NGOs,
and weakening States’ national institutions because, in a way, it is better
to let the NGOs take care of the problems instead of not getting the relief
aid funding at all.
A study conducted by the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti
shows the United States’ disbursements of humanitarian funding of 1.295
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(2011),
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Nov, 8, 2014).
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Government, PARTNERS IN HEALTH (June 29, 2011), http://www.pih.org/blog/un-special-envoyreport-more-aid-should-be-channeled-through-haitis-elected. (“Over the past year, donors have
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distributed to the Haitian Government – the democratically elected public entity most capable of
producing jobs and initiating the massive rebuilding effort facing the nation.”).
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billion dollars for Haiti since 2010.108 Out of that gigantic amount, fortynine percent of the money went to the countries donors’ own civil and
military entities with the rest going to the UN agencies and other
contractors and international NGOs.109 The Haitian government received
only one percent of the $0.995 billion recovery funding.110
A state’s dependency on NGOs’ assistance can also interfere with
the accountability of those States to its citizens. For instance, in some
Receiving States, not everyone has regular access to education. In many,
there are just not enough resources to provide schooling for rural
inhabitants. In others, students might have to walk long distances to get
to schools or, there might be little to no educational infrastructure in
place to provide continuous and relevant education. In any of these
circumstances, a government might decide to rely on NGOs to reach the
needs of the population. In so doing, it relinquishes to international aid
all of its responsibility to provide education to those underserved
citizens. At the same time, that government is also counting on
organizations such as United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) to subsidize a portion of the education budget.111
In such cases, one or more NGOs that are active in education may assist
the Receiving Country by sending teachers to the underserved portions of
the population every three to six months in order to educate the children.
However, if funding tapers off, the NGOs may no longer be able to bear
the costs of sending more teachers, in which case, they become less and
less active in the area. Even though the NGOs may have provided muchneeded relief by educating the children, in too many cases, the relief is
short-term. If they did not work with the States to create an infrastructure
for providing teachers to these underserved portions of the population,
together with a plan enabling the continued use and development of the
infrastructure, their efforts would not be maximized for the best longterm results. The affected population would again be left with no
infrastructure and would again be at the mercy of international
generosity. This scenario enables a government to shirk its responsibility.
More importantly, it distorts the relationship of the State with its citizens,
who may believe that their own government played a role in providing
the services and who now expect that government to continue providing
those services.
As illustrated by this example, when a State relies heavily on NGOs’
assistance, this reliance creates conditions of State dependency, nonautonomy, weak national institutions, and compromised government
108
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relationship and accountability to citizens. The lack of State
accountability to its citizens likewise results in the citizens losing
confidence in their government and relying on themselves and
international help for basic needs.
3. Receiving States’ Population General Dependency
As mentioned earlier, the humanitarian aid from international
organizations can create a relationship of reliance by the State and its
citizens.112 Typically, an NGO’s work is more visible and accessible than
that of the state.113 As a result, the population in the Receiving State
comes to rely on humanitarian aid rather than the state, or itself, for
many of the most fundamental public services. A consequence of this
dependency is citizens not needing to find any method of coping with the
lack of governmental structures. Instead, they take the attitude of “wait
and see” or fatalism.114 When the situation becomes bad enough, either
because of the government’s incapacity or unwillingness to provide for
its citizens, NGOs then step in to provide food, water, housing, or other
basic services for the affected part of the population. In certain cases,
some governments have even blamed the NGOs for unpopular or poor
social services, as if they do not have a part to play in providing the
services.115 Thus, in the long-term, a lack of governmental involvement
in providing assistance does not promote State self-reliance because,
rather than relying on the capacity or efficiency of their own government,
citizens wait to see what aid an NGO will provide in the hope that it will
be better than any self-help.116
Furthermore, the populations of the Receiving States perceive the
continued aid as more stable than government aid, even though in reality,
NGOs operate on a temporary basis.117 As established above, because
NGOs are more flexible and have less bureaucracy than the State
governments, they can establish operations fairly quickly in a new area.
In many cases, they then provide employment opportunities to the local
population. This employment can be very helpful over the short-term;
however, if there are not permanent, or at least long-term opportunities, it
112
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creates heavy reliance on the NGOs. 118 People who are qualified
professionals accept work with NGOs in temporary positions as drivers,
translators, administrative assistants, nursing assistants, etc. With their
immediate needs met, these professionals do not challenge the State to
create more employment opportunities in the area; the NGOs’ jobs are
more readily available and provide immediate income. One major pitfall
of this phenomenon is “brain drain”—resulting in people with more
education leaving the area for more lucrative jobs. 119
As a result of temporary employment, competent workers prefer to
work with NGOs rather than national institutions. These organizations
generally pay better,120 and there is a certain prestige associated with
working for international organizations. 121 As professionals move
towards NGOs, the organizations move into direct competition with the
government they purport to help. This would not be a problem if the
States did not need the external assistance. If that were the case, the
additional jobs would increase competitiveness and boost the local
economy. However, since the States most likely need the external
assistance, the danger lies in the temporary nature of the boost. After a
while, NGOs leave and the local State population is again faced with the
reality of unemployment.122
A counter-argument to this dependency argument is that the jobs that
are created by the NGOs were not available to the population in the first
place. Whether the work is temporary or not, providing the people an
opportunity to work for these NGOs is better than no opportunity at all.
This argument might present valid points, but does not maximize the
NGOs’ potential to help. Nor can it serve as a successful model when
NGOs use short-term relief for a long period of time. Relief efforts
should be a provisional support to States in order to help them develop
long-term infrastructure.123 Instead, NGOs use that provisional support
for a long time with the funds provided by international donors. When
this occurs, the jobs provided by the NGOs could arguably be taking
skilled workers away from other long-term, sustainable projects.
Employment by NGOs, as a temporary structure, creates a false or
skewed sense of employment or “band-aid” relief. In certain cases, it
encourages a disconnection between the local government and the
citizens because the State is not directly implicated in providing
fundamental public or social services. In other cases, the temporary
structure provided by the NGOs allows the local government to
118
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discharge its accountability vis-à-vis the citizens because the people
expect the NGOs to fill the need.
Lastly, NGOs, in the aggregate, bring a lot of people with them.
Often, in the Receiving States where the infrastructure is generally
missing, the NGOs look to private citizens to provide the basic
infrastructure needed to operate, such as providing temporary housing,
transportation, and laborers including security guards, housekeepers, and
technicians. Due to the higher demand for services created by the NGOs,
the market becomes artificially inflated. After NGOs cease work in the
country, it can be difficult for the general population to afford postNGOs lifestyle. 124 When the NGOs create temporary work, people
become accustomed to a certain superficial standard of living including
raised housing prices, rented private cars on a daily basis, rented
buildings as temporary headquarters or convention centers, etc.;
however, this is not a permanent infrastructure that can promote enduring
or constant growth.125
4. Lack of Long-Term Plans and Infrastructure
One underpinning problem presented within all the previous
problems outlined is the lack of long-term plans and infrastructure from
both the States themselves and the NGOs working in those States. As
one recent report noted:
The barriers to implementing and reaping the benefits of an
effective government performance audit function stem from
the same fundamental challenges facing development for any
other aspect of a society. These challenges include
corruption; poverty; poor governance, at both the political
and administrative levels; inadequate infrastructure; and
brain drain.126
Additionally, NGOs lack accountability; they generally work in
geographic areas directly with the people. In certain cases, it can be hard
to estimate the amount of work that has actually been done by an NGO127
unless the NGO itself promotes transparency and keeps accurate records.
Without transparency and records, work performed by a government or
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an NGO is unaccounted for, and, in the case of an NGO, there is no
concrete or outward confirmation of the assistance. 128
Lack of accountability can interfere with the relationship of trust
between a State and its population. Furthermore, it does not reinforce the
social contract between the State and the population, 129 but rather
encourages the people to rely on NGOs.
Furthermore, the assistance is oftentimes based on very
commendable day-to-day help or on an emergency, but after a few years,
no real constructive framework has been established to support a longterm sustainable structure. Instead, States still seem to suffer from a lack
of infrastructure and are still in need of the same assistance from another
NGO because there is no real structure to create lasting relief. When
countries rely too much on NGOs’ assistance and do not have long-term
plans, it ends up undermining the assistance that the NGOs intended to
provide in the first place. All the help that the NGOs provided feels like
just a drop in the ocean, which in turn creates a cycle of dependency on
NGOs’ work instead of creating sustainable structures. One recent
commentator described the problem this way:
On top of the earthquake, aid workers in Haiti are
contending with a cholera crisis, a disease of poverty
spread through poor sanitation and contaminated
drinking water. These are all things that NGOs like the
Red Cross have expertise in fighting, but larger
structural issues often trump their best intentions…
The money that poured into Haiti after the earthquake
was focused almost solely on relief efforts in and around
Port-au-Prince. As a result, dozens of health-oriented
NGOs in Haiti focused their work in the capital, all but
ignoring the countryside. So last October, when reports
of people dropping dead of cholera in the rural
Artibonite Valley 90 miles from the capital began to
emerge, many in the aid community were blindsided.
Even as the epidemic made its way to Port-au-Prince,
some relief organizations still didn't respond. 130
This gives the impression that the State and the humanitarian
organizations go from extinguishing one fire while another one pops up,
and work is done without projecting into the future or creating long-term
plans to establish a better system. Therefore, an emerging norm for
NGOs to work with and coordinate with the Receiving States would
enhance the assistance the NGOs are trying to offer.
128
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C. Emerging Norm: As Part of NGOs International Best Practices
In light of the problems mentioned, the proposed norm will create a
better model of humanitarian assistance that NGOs can observe as part of
international best practices in any Receiving Country. Such a norm
would create and inspire mutual respect, a quid pro quo generated by
working relationships in an effort to strengthen the Receiving States’
efforts, aid the national institutions and the relationship between States
and the citizens, and build the people’s confidence in creating
opportunities for themselves for a more sustainable economic future.
An emerging norm to work and coordinate with Receiving States,
while working there, would enhance the assistance the NGOs offer by
providing provisional support to the States while encouraging and
promoting long-term institutional development and behavioral changes.
Encouraging the NGOs and Receiving States to work together would
mitigate some of the problems caused by the lack of long-term plans and
general infrastructure that the States face during and after disasters. This
norm would encourage the parties to sit down and devise better ways to
help each other accomplish the tasks that each wishes to accomplish.
Instead of NGOs and States working independently of each other or
NGOs replacing the States in certain capacities, they could coordinate
their efforts to create a sustainable system that would help States launch
programs promoting autonomy, self-sufficiency, and national growth. A
model that NGOs would be able to rely on and consistently implement as
an international best practice will be discussed in the following case
study.
IV. CASE STUDY
This Part turns to a case study that illustrates the need to have
Receiving States and NGOs cooperate with each other in order to
maximize the results of an effective and coordinated effort when offering
humanitarian assistance. The case study will explore the situation of Free
Rice in Haiti and will consider whether the assistance would have been
more effective had the NGOs coordinated their efforts with the Haitian
government. It will also assess whether the assistance provided by the
NGOs undermined Haiti. Finally, it will look at whether or not the aid
will serve Haiti’s best interest in the long-term.
Haiti is used as the case study because of the confluence of NGOs in
the country known as “the Republic of NGOs.”131 The problems stressed
in the case study, nonetheless, are not unique to Haiti, but are generally
131
Vijaya Ramachandran & Julie Walz, Is Haiti Doomed to Be the Republic of NGOs?,
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posed in relation to NGOs’ work in Receiving States. 132 Despite the
NGOs’ goodwill and intentions after decades of work in Haiti, the
country is still in a state of dependency with a disarticulated and broken
economy. 133 The case study points to the problems expressed in the
previous section and establishes that rather than funneling the donated
funds through NGOs and discounting the state,134 the emerging standard
of the NGOs working with the States would be more effective in creating
a sense of investment and accountability with all actors that would help
establish a model of assistance with similar Receiving States. 135
A. The Case of Free Rice in Haiti
“First, the quake damaged the nation's main port, disrupting the
regular supply of imported rice. . . . Then, aid groups distributed free rice
to thousands of people—who stopped buying rice from street vendors. . .
. As demand dried up, the street vendors stopped buying from small,
local rice wholesalers. That’s been a devastating blow to many vendors
and small wholesalers.”136
This excerpt describes in a few lines what is known as “the case of
free rice in Haiti.”137 Similar to the problems presented earlier, this case
illustrates the non-coordination between the humanitarian international
aid, whose purposes violated the Haitian government’s policies regarding
the agricultural sector, and the local population who needed help the
most. 138 The aid groups that distributed the free rice in an effort to
provide humanitarian assistance to thousands of people after the
earthquake, while motivated by the best intentions, had a substantial
negative effect on the country’s agricultural sector. 139 One recent
commentator described how the subsidization of rice by international
organizations undermined Haiti’s efforts. 140 He said: “As recently as the
early 1980s, Haiti was producing just about all of its own rice. Now more
than 60 percent is imported from the US, making it the fourth largest
recipient of American rice exports in the world.”141 The author expressed
some criticisms as the rice subsidization was encouraged by President
Clinton “to help his home State of Arkansas, the largest rice producing
state in the US, thereby crippling a sector of the economy in Haiti where
132
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Clinton has worked so tirelessly to help with the recovery.” 142 He
continues: “You might say it is a perfect metaphor for what is wrong
with aid to Haiti,” says Marc Cohen, a senior researcher for Oxfam, one
of the largest non-government organizations in the world, which raised
approximately $106 million for a three-year response but struggled to
deliver the aid effectively.” 143 Still from the article, Mr. Cohen from
Oxfam adds: “Instead of bringing subsidized rice in on ships from
Miami, we could be helping Haiti grow rice in its own fields.” 144 Cohen
worked for many years in Haiti with the International Food Policy
Research Institute and studied the broad economic impact of American
rice subsidies.145
The donated funds and rice, in this case, increased Haiti’s
dependency on the international help, which resulted in the country’s
state of non-autonomy, weakened national institutions, and distortion of
accountability to the citizens. Rather than helping Haiti be more selfsufficient and grow its industries, the NGOs’ assistance, in spite of
worthy intentions, weakened the country’s rice production in the longterm. The NGOs’ help in providing rice to the people during the disaster
was very beneficial at that time. 146 The interference occurred in the years
following the disaster as the NGOs continued to distribute free rice.147
These distributions did not have a desirable effect on Haiti’s national
institutions, and essentially discounted Haiti’s efforts. 148 The USAID
subsidized CARE International (an NGO) to distribute the rice to the
impoverished peasants. 149 “The NGO began to distribute U.S. crops as
food aid, during both bad and good harvests, further undermining Haitian
peasant’s ability to compete for the market.” 150 Often the CARE brand
was still affixed to the rice packaging after the local elites would receive
the food and resold it on the market. 151 “CARE seemed to care so little
that it never really followed up on the consequences of its food aid
program.”152 As mentioned earlier with the American study conducted by
the UN office of special Envoy for Haiti, over ninety-eight percent of the
foreign aid was given to partners more trusted by some donors, generally
the NGOs, which had worked in Haiti for years. 153 “But these groups,
while experienced in relief, were not as knowledgeable about what it
takes to rebuild a nation . . . . Much of the money on these contracts to
NGOs goes to their overhead.”154
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Top NGO and Private Contractor Recipients of
United States Contracts and Assistance in Haiti,
2010–2012155
($US 654 million)
Chemonics International

153

International Organization for Migration

86

ACC Construction–McKnight Joint Venture

81

DAI/Nathan Group

69

World Vision

56

PAE Government Services

54

Catholic Relief Services

50

Management Sciences for Health

39

Family Health International/FHI 360

35

Haitian Study Group Kaposi Sarcoma (GHESKIO) 31
As discussed earlier, by continually subsidizing the NGOs instead of
the Receiving States, there is also a risk of counter productivity with
respect to the States’ efforts and the NGOs’ desire to assist them. This
practice of rice subsidization had been going on for over a decade (even
before the disaster), which had not helped the country’s self-reliance as
to the agriculture sector nor encouraged Haiti to provide solutions to the
problems associated with the dependency.
The rice subsidization undermined the existing government and its
policies by creating more State dependency on rice that the NGOs were
providing, and weakening the country’s national institutions because it
was better to let the NGOs weaken the economy instead of not receiving
the relief aid at all and not being able to feed the population.
The food security problems in the twenty-first century in Haiti as
agued by some free-trade critics are caused or exacerbated by the
structural adjustment policies proposed and promoted by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. 156 “These policies led Haiti to
reduce rice tariffs from 50 to 3 percent, a shift that allowed large
amounts of subsidized rice grown in the United States to enter the
Haitian market, displacing Haitian-grown rice and destroying the
livelihoods of rice farmers.”157 It was known as the “American Plan,”
which was a disaster. 158 Small farms could not compete against the
155
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subsidized imported rice from the United States. 159 Farmers were forced
to look for survival elsewhere and grounded the already overpopulated
towns of Port-au-Prince while working at the American-owned assembly
plants, earning less than two dollars a day. 160
Former President Clinton apologized for the plan before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in March of 2010. 161 He said, “We made
this devil's bargain, and it wasn't the right thing to do. . . . It was a
mistake that I was a party to. I did that. I have to live every day with the
consequences.”162
The rice subsidization in Haiti also illustrates the reliance of the
population on international humanitarian aid rather than on the
government or on the people themselves. To the general population, it
appeared that the government did not have the capacity to support or
revamp the rice industry and had to rely on the rice the NGOs were
distributing in certain regions of the country. The people then, rather than
putting pressure on the State to remedy the situation, relied on NGO aid
(although sometimes with an attitude of resignation). Some people even
resold the rice and created temporary income from NGO subsidization.
The NGOs have also reproduced and exacerbated class inequality in
Haiti. 163 Since the NGOs can pay much better than anyone else,
including the Haitian state, they have swept up middle class
professionals into their ranks. 164 Haitians actually now call them the
“NGO class.” As anthropologist Mark Schuller writes:
In addition to higher salaries, NGO employees have
access to many privileges: clean drinking water,
electricity to charge cell phones, e-mail and the everprized U.S. visa. These privileges in turn plug
individuals into the global economy. People’s first visits
to the U.S. solidified neoliberal ideologies. This
artificial, dependent middle class–the “NGO class”–thus
directly support a form of economic globalization,
accomplishes ideological work and further stratifies the
Haitian population, selecting a chosen few for privileges
denied Haiti’s poor majority.165
This situation not only demonstrates the dependence of the
population on the NGOs’ well-meaning intentions of providing
temporary employment, but also the fragile condition that can result from
the false or skewed sense of that temporary employment or band-aid
relief.
The lack of long-term plans and structure from the NGOs that are
working in Haiti for long periods does not encourage the long-term
159
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institutional development or behavioral changes that would help Haiti
progressively be less dependent of the aid and move towards selfinitiated, economic growth.
In April 2009, Senator Hillary Clinton ordered a thorough review of
U.S. policy toward Haiti. 166 She wanted a new strategy grounded in
“evidence-based solutions.”167 “The idea,” recalls Cheryl Mills, Clinton’s
Chief of Staff, “was that if we’re putting in the assistance, we need to
know what the outcomes are going to be.”168 Mills was appalled by the
abysmal record of U.S. aid in Haiti, and was particularly critical of the
NGOs, many of which had spent decades there without producing any
lasting change.169
One commentator gives a fairly accurate summary of the problems
highlighted in the report:
A central issue within the NGO system is coordination.
According to the Haitian Minister of Planning and
Foreign Cooperation (MPCE), on any given year, only
10-20% of NGOs submit their annual report to the
government, despite it being a requirement to function in
the country. Since the 1980s through 2009, almost every
report commissioned by donors, government of Haiti,
NGOs, or independent researchers, on NGOs concludes
with a recommendation that NGOs need to do a better
job coordinating with one another, and the government
needs to set a framework that NGOs will work under, to
avoid duplication of services and gaps and to ensure that
local development priorities are being implemented.
....
The fact that for almost 30 years researchers from across
the political spectrum make the same recommendations
suggests that NGOs continue to act on their own. Many
in Haiti call NGOs “parallel States” or “States within the
state” or simply “fiefdoms” because of their tendency
toward isolation and near total control over geographical
regions. Further, NGOs directly drain the capacity of the
State by paying much higher salaries – many people
estimate three times greater – what World Bank
researcher Alice Morton termed “raiding” (1997:25).170
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V. ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECT OF THE EMERGING NORM AS
PART OF NGOS’ BEST PRACTICES
In spite of generous intentions of the NGOs to assist Receiving
States, the aid, if distributed on an emergency basis for a long period of
time, and not done in coordination with the States, has the potential to
escalate the problems already present in those countries or even create
additional burdens. As demonstrated in the case study and throughout the
article, NGOs can be perceived as “parallel States” or “States within the
state” or simply “fiefdoms.”171 They can create unintended consequences
while attempting to help the Receiving Countries. When the aid is not
coordinated, it can undermine the Receiving States, or not serve the
States’ best interest in the long-term. For NGOs and Receiving States to
accomplish long-term sustainable changes, NGOs should take on the
responsibility to coordinate relief efforts with the State actors to ensure a
functioning model that would be added to the NGOs’ best practices and
could be replicated in any country.
This emerging norm to have NGOs work with Receiving States is
not unreasonable or unrealizable. The NGOs can develop a working
relationship with the Receiving States, and this system is proven to
generate a more effective result.172 An example of such collaboration
between NGOs and States is demonstrated in an NGO–government
partnerships project for disaster preparedness in Bangladesh where all
parties are working together to “support capacity-building for
preparedness, with a particular focus on collaboration between
government actors and civil society.”173 The project was realized by six
humanitarian and development NGOs (CARE, Catholic Relief Services,
Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Save the Children, and World Vision) now
working in collaboration with the local government and other actors in
five pilot countries around the world.174 It is a successful project that
encourages the NGOs and the States to work together on long-term
plans, capacity building programs that are focused on disaster risk
reduction, staff capacity, accountability, and impact measurement. 175
It has likewise been done in Haiti in the healthcare sector where an
NGO (Partners in Health/Zanmi Lasante) focused on long-term
improvement was working with the government to establish sustainable
changes.176 This NGO is an example of successful partnership between
an NGO and the Haitian government in the healthcare sector. The
conditions in Haiti were difficult regarding that sector even before the
2010 earthquake, but this partnership has improved the conditions of the
local population. 177 “Ground was recently broken on a new, large
171
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capacity teaching hospital in Mirebalais in partnership with Partners in
Health/Zanmi Lasante and the Haitian government, approved by the
Haiti Reconstruction Fund in their second meeting in August.”178
This NGO, working in collaboration with the Haitian government,
shows that such collaboration yields much better long-term results. This
hospital is now open and functional. 179 The hospital provides primary
care services to about 185,000 people in Mirebalais, Haiti, and two
nearby communities.180 Patients from a much wider area—all of central
Haiti and areas in and around Port-au-Prince—can also receive
secondary and tertiary care.181 As many as 700 patients are seen every
day in the ambulatory clinics.182 At a time when Haiti desperately needs
skilled professionals, the hospital provides high-quality education for the
next generation of Haitian nurses, medical students, and resident
physicians. 183 This is an example of a strong collaboration between
humanitarian actors and the State that produced something durable that
could be replicated around the country or with different NGOs. It is an
example of best practices.
Another example of NGO coordination with a Receiving State that
produced dynamic results is represented in a study prepared by the
Support for Analysis and Research in Africa (SARA) project in
partnership with the USAID, Bureau for Africa, and Office of
Sustainable Development.184 This study contemplated the potential of
achieving better results in the education sector between NGOs and four
different Receiving States in Africa (Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi and Mali)
by building a perdurable partnership and collaborative relationship
between the main actors.185
Such models of working relationships demonstrate the anticipated
positive effect of the emerging norm as part of NGOs best practices to
work and coordinate with Receiving States. United with Receiving
States, they create an effective effort when offering assistance. This
would be a more productive model that could be replicated in any other
country with the same needs and safeguard a more consistent model of
international humanitarian aid standard. This model would also be
effective in helping the Receiving States develop overall plans to
strengthen their national institutions where the NGOs can lend their
expertise and work with the States on a more long-term basis. This is a
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model that could be benchmarked and applied in different contexts or
countries with some tailoring and modification.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without advocating for non-participation of NGOs in the
humanitarian aid system, nor denying the generous aid they have
provided in emergency situations and humanitarian assistance all over
the world, a new standard for NGOs to work and cooperate with
Receiving States would be beneficial and promote a best practice in
delivering the international aid.
NGOs play an important role in the development of international law
and many have been active in providing emergency response. That is
why the proposed emerging norm to work with the Receiving States
would be a key step toward delivering better assistance and helping the
States achieve viable changes. Receiving States would have to make
substantial efforts to be able to handle international support; at the same
time, NGO undertakings and donor funding must support and assist
States’ efforts rather than replace them. Otherwise, NGO assistance will
not produce visible, beneficial outcomes.
This proposed framework for NGOs would ensure a more consistent
practice that would not undermine the Receiving Countries. It would
encourage the States to be accountable to their citizens, instead of relying
heavily on NGOs to provide the services they have responsibility over. It
would also empower a Receiving State in its efforts to develop general or
structural plans with the NGOs’ expertise.
Instead of just relying on humanitarian aid over a period of many
years, the new norm would help develop a model that will encourage
self-sufficiency and accountability from all the actors. It would also
strongly encourage long-term institutional development and behavioral
changes with the countries the NGOs so willingly want to help.

28

